MEMO TO THE PARTNER
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE CONVERSION RIGHTS FOR
MANDATORY CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK
Ben Dickenson *
TO:

Law Office Partner

FROM:

Associate

RE:

Fundamental Change Conversion Rights for Mandatory
Convertible Preferred Stock

INTRODUCTION
You requested that I draft the conversion rights and notice
portions of a “Fundamental Change” conversion provision for the
Certificate of Designations for a series of preferred stock that ABC, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation (“ABC”) will issue to our client, Venture, Ltd., a
Delaware corporation (“Venture”). I have attached Rider A, containing
the draft provisions, and a glossary for your review. In this memo, I will
provide the transactional context for this issuance, identify the substantive
legal issues involved, and analyze my drafting decisions. Unless noted
otherwise, capitalized terms used and not defined in this memorandum
have the same meaning given to them in Rider A and/or in the attached
glossary. Any other such terms maintain their meaning as indicated in prior
drafts of the Certificate of Designation.
I. TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT
ABC, a Delaware public corporation headquartered in Tennessee,
is raising capital by issuing 1,000,000 shares of 9.00% Series A Mandatory
Convertible Preferred Stock (the “Series A Preferred Stock”) to our client,
Venture, Ltd. (“Venture”), a Delaware corporation. Venture is a venture
B.A., Lee University; J.D., The University of Tennessee College of Law. The Author
will join Husch Blackwell, LLP as a first-year Associate in the fall of 2018. I would like
to thank Professor Joan Heminway who provided significant commentary and feedback
on this project.
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capital holding company headquartered in Tennessee. ABC is a rapidly
growing tech company that has had significant success with several new
smartphone “apps,” including apps that provide users with low-cost rides
and low-cost options to rent temporary accommodations out of other
persons’ homes and apartments. ABC’s stock value has been consistently
increasing due to its consistent record of providing stellar apps involving
the gig economy. ABC is seeking capital for the development of a new app
that allows users to post chores and tasks to an online task board. The app
will connect users with independent contractors who will bid on and
complete the desired tasks.
With ABC’s upward trajectory, Venture believes that this is a lowrisk, high-reward opportunity. Initially, Venture wants preferred stock
with priority dividends, rather than voting control. ABC and Venture have
already agreed to and drafted provisions for the following: (1) a Mandatory
Conversion provision that will convert all 1,000,000 preferred shares at a
favorable conversion rate five calendar years from the date of issuance; (2)
a floating Mandatory Conversion Rate provision based on Conversion
Chart detailing the applicable rate based on the underlying value of ABC’s
common stock on the Mandatory Conversion Date; (3) an Optional
Conversion provision providing Venture, but not ABC, the right to
convert the Series A Preferred Stock at any time, but at a lower
conversation rate in the Conversion Chart; and (4) a Fundamental Change
make-whole provision that will provide recompense for lost dividends if
Venture converts its preferred shares upon the occurrence of such a
transaction. The Series A Preferred Stock will pay dividends at an annual
rate of 9.00% of the Liquidation Preference, and the Liquidation
Preference shall be set at $75.00 per share of Series A Preferred Stock.
However, Venture is concerned that ABC, as a rising star in the
market, will be acquired, merged with, or reorganized before five years
pass. Venture wants a provision that provides Venture an optional
conversion upon the occurrence of such a Fundamental Change that
provides a better conversion rate. If ABC changes hands, Venture wants
a larger share of the common stock and, thus, the ability to have more
voting power post-transaction. Alternatively, Venture wants the
opportunity to convert to ensure it is treated equally to holders of the
common stock in a cash-out or similar merger. Venture also wants the
option to convert either all or a portion of the preferred shares. ABC
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prefers a mandatory conversion of all preferred shares upon a
Fundamental Change so as to give ABC more control over the disposition
of the preferred shares. Venture also wants to ensure ABC provides
adequate notice of the date of such an event and a sufficient time window
to convert after the transaction so that it may act appropriately in response
to a Fundamental Change. We are providing an initial first draft of the
Fundamental Change provision to ABC in a week, and you directed me to
lean on the side of more investor-friendly protections in the conversion
rights and notice sections that we may negotiate down at a later date.
Pursuant to General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware
(“DGCL”) section 151, ABC’s Certificate of Incorporation provides
ABC’s board of directors with authority to issue two classes of stock,
common and preferred. ABC’s Certificate of Incorporation authorizes its
board to issue 200,000,000 shares of common stock and 50,000,000 shares
of preferred stock. ABC’s Certificate of Incorporation grants ABC’s board
of directors “blank check” authority to issue shares of preferred stock in
one or more series at the board’s sole discretion in accordance with DGCL
section 151(a) & (g). This “blank check” provision allows ABC’s board to
fix, by resolution, the designation, powers, preferences, and rights of any
series of preferred stock. Additionally, pursuant to DGCL section 151(e),
the Certificate grants the board the power to decide “whether or not the
shares of such series shall be subject to conversion into common stock
and the times, prices, and other terms and conditions of such
conversion.” 1
As of today, ABC has 100,000,000 shares of common stock and
no shares of preferred stock outstanding. ABC’s common stock is publicly
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, with an average trading price
over the last twelve months of $75.00 per share. Venture has agreed in
principle to invest $15,000,0000 in financing for ABC’s newest app
development. In consideration, pursuant to DGCL section 161, ABC will
issue 1,000,000 shares of 9.00% Series A Mandatory Convertible Preferred
Stock, par value of $.001 per share and an Initial Value of $15.00 per share
to Venture.

1

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(e) (West 2018).
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ABC plans to apply for an exemption to registration for this
offering with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to
comply with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. 2
ABC will apply for an exemption under SEC Rule 506(b) of Regulation D
because Venture is an accredited, and the only, investor. 3 Also, ABC will
consult with its securities attorneys to comply with the Delaware Securities
Act and applicable Delaware securities law. 4
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Should the Fundamental Change conversion be mandatory or optional? 5
Both parties have differing goals in drafting the Fundamental
Change conversion provision as either mandatory or optional for Venture.
ABC desires that Venture’s preferred shares must convert upon the
occurrence of a Fundamental Change, albeit at a more favorable
conversion rate. This conversion would provide ABC the de facto right to
eliminate the preferred shares’ priority dividends before the five-year
Mandatory Conversion Date upon ABC’s decision to go through a
Fundamental Change; however, any conversion would be subject to a
dividend make-whole premium. 6 Venture desires an optional conversion
so that Venture may adequately review its options regarding the
transaction, including either exercising the option to receive equal
treatment with common stock or abstaining if the terms of the
Fundamental Change do not negatively impact its preferred shares’ rights. 7
2 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (broad definition of
“security” includes preferred stock); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012) (“sell” includes any
“disposition of a security.”).
3 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2018).
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 73-208(b) (West 2018).
5 “Fundamental Change” is defined in the glossary.
6 See Andrew M. Johnston & Ryan J. Greecher, Preferred Stock, 99 CORPORATE PRACTICE
PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA), available at Bloomberg Law (discussing how mandatory
conversion provisions can “allow other groups to control outcomes for the preferred
stockholders who are subject to the automatic conversion.”).
7 See, e.g., Alta Berkeley VI C.V. v. Omneon, Inc., 41 A.3d 381 (Del. 2012) (holding that
an automatic conversion provision of preferred stock was effectively a restriction on that
stock that, when triggered, could prevent other rights of the preferred stock (such as a
deemed liquidation provision) from being effective); AGR Halifax Fund, Inc. v. Fiscina,
743 A.2d 1188, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1999) (upholding an optional conversion that enabled
preferred shareholders to obtain a majority of common stock and replace the company’s
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2. Does the Fundamental Change Conversion Right’s partial conversion option
and timing protect Venture’s investment without overly burdening ABC’s
interests?
Both parties are haggling over the flexibility of the conversion
right. Specifically, Venture wants the right to convert either all or less than
all of the preferred shares upon the occurrence of a Fundamental Change.
ABC prefers conversion of all shares in one transaction, but ABC is not
contesting this point much because Venture will be the sole owner of all
of the Series A Preferred Stock. 9 The parties are also negotiating whether
Venture may convert on or after the Effective Date of a Fundamental
Change and the length of the time-period after the transaction when
Venture may elect to convert. 10
8

3. Does the Fundamental Change Notice requirement provide adequate and timely
notice to Venture without unreasonably burdening ABC’s board of directors?
Both parties agree that it is important that ABC provide sufficient
notice to Venture of any Fundamental Change. 11 Under Delaware law and
in limited circumstances, directors may effectuate a Fundamental Change
through controlling shareholders’ consent and without prior notice to

board of directors, despite technical failure of shareholders to surrender certificates
within a reasonable time after notice of conversion).
8 Ben Walther, The Peril and Promise of Preferred Stock, 39 DEL J. CORP. L. 161, 162 (2014)
(discussing how preferred stock has “virtually disappeared in most mature industries,
largely because preferred shareholders have found it terribly difficult to protect the value
of their investment.”).
9 See Preferred Stock in Private Equity Transactions, WESTLAW PRACTICE NOTE, available
at Westlaw Practical Law: US Capital Markets & Corporate Governance, Resource ID 1547-3885 (discussing how companies typically “allow any investor to convert the
preferred stock to common stock at any time after the issuance date” if there is only one
holder).
10 Three precedent documents permit conversion on the date of the transaction; two
permit it the day after. The conversion period usually ranges from ten to thirty days after
the transaction.
11 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (West 2018) (providing a board the ability to enact
a Fundamental Change without prior notice to other shareholders if the change is
consented to by the majority of shareholders in lieu of a meeting). DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 228(e) (West 2018) (requiring the corporation to provide “prompt notice” to nonconsenting shareholders following the action taken in lieu of the meeting).
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shareholders. 12 ABC wants a shorter period of time between notice and
the occurrence of a Fundamental Change so that Venture has less time to
persuade voting shareholders to vote against the change. Venture desires
a longer period of time so as not to be caught off guard without adequate
time to prepare how to respond to such change. 13 However, the parties
generally agree on the substantive terms to be included in the notice. 14
III. ANALYSIS OF DRAFTING CHOICES
A. Major Drafting Decisions
1. Type of Fundamental Change Conversion
An optional right of conversion is preferable to a mandatory
conversion upon the occurrence of a Fundamental Change. ABC prefers
the mandatory conversion because it gives ABC the de facto ability to rid
itself of the preferred shares and its priority dividends through a
Fundamental Change at the directors’ and common stock holders’
behest. 15 Venture staunchly objects to such a provision. Owing to the
significant risk inherent in preferred stock, a potential investor in preferred
equity will always negotiate for as much control as possible. 16

12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(e) (West
2018); see also Klotz v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 674 A.2d 878 (Del. 1995) (affirming
approval by Warner Communications, Inc.’s shareholders of a merger with Time, Inc.
without a meeting or prior notice to other shareholders pursuant to General Corporation
Law of the State of Delaware section 228(a) after Time had purchased a majority of
Warner stock).
13 The concept of notice is prevalent in corporate governance. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 251(c) (West 2018) (requiring 20 days’ prior notice to all stockholders of a
stockholder meeting to approve a merger, consolidation or conversion of the
corporation).
14 The precedent transaction documents I found had almost identical provisions
regarding what substantive notice must be provided to preferred shareholders in advance
of a Fundamental Change.
15 Walther, supra note 8, at 190–92 (citing Equity-Linked Inv’rs, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d
1040 (Del. Ch. 1997)) (discussing how Equity-Linked reflected an embrace of a “model of
fiduciary duties that casts the board as a bully, picking fights with the preferred on behalf
of the common.”).
16 Walther, supra note 8, at 164, 190–196 (discussing how recent Delaware decisions have
“eroded” directors’ fiduciary duties to preferred shareholders so they largely exist “in
name only.”). See also LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd., v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 438–39 (Del.
Ch. 2010).
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An optional conversion right provides Venture with a greater
degree of control in the face of a hostile Fundamental Change sought by
ABC’s board and common equity holders. 17 It will provide Venture with
the ability to assess the consequences of a Fundamental Change and act
accordingly, e.g., by converting the preferred shares to receive equal
treatment with common equity in a merger. 18 Additionally, the more
favorable Fundamental Change Conversion Rate (as negotiated in another
provision) will ensure Venture has a stronger position if faced with
aggressive action by ABC’s board. ABC will likely concede this point as
such provisions predominantly provide the holder an optional, rather than
a mandatory, conversion right. 19 ABC’s sophisticated counsel will likely
understand Venture’s concerns about the vulnerability of preferred
stock. 20
An additional phrase in the first sentence clarifies that a
Fundamental Change conversion must occur “in connection with” such a
transaction. I added an additional sentence clarifying what conversion “in
connection with” a Fundamental Change means and describing the period
of time during which this must take place (see below for more details on
this conversion period). 21 This clarification provides Venture additional
protection if litigation arises concerning whether a conversion was
appropriately elected due to a Fundamental Change transaction.

E.g., AGR Halifax Fund, Inc. v. Fiscina, 743 A.2d 1188, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1999) (optional
conversion that enabled preferred shareholders to obtain a majority of common stock
and replace the company’s directors).
18 Johnston & Greecher, supra note 6.
19 See, e.g., Onconova Therapeutics, Inc., Certificate of Designation (Form S-1/A) (Feb.
12, 2018) (“Onconova”); Harte Hanks, Inc., Certificate of Designation (Form 8-K) (Jan.
29, 2018) (“Harte”); Cowen Grp., Inc., Certificate of Designation (Form 8-K) (May 20,
2015) (“Cowen Group”); Resolute Energy, Inc., Certificate of Designation
(Form 8-K) (Oct. 7, 2016) (“Resolute Energy”); Jones Energy, Inc., Certificate of
Designation (Form 8-K) (Aug. 26, 2016) (“Jones Energy”) (collectively, the “precedent
documents”). All five precedent documents had a special conversion option upon the
occurrence of a Fundamental Change.
20 Walther, supra note 8, at 196 (arguing that convertible preferred investors must
“expressly negotiate for contractual provisions that protect it from the abuses” of
directors and common equity holders).
21 Similar clarifications existed in three out of five of the precedent documents. E.g.,
Cowen Group; Resolute Energy; Jones Energy.
17
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2. Flexibility of Fundamental Change Conversion
The conversion provision provides Venture discretion to convert
either all or some of the preferred shares, in whole parts, into common
equity at the applicable rate. This flexibility will allow Venture to benefit
from partial conversion while retaining some preferred shares to be
converted at a later date, depending on the underlying price of ABC’s
common stock and the terms of the transaction. While ABC may prefer
the entire disposition of the preferred stock in one transaction, such
flexibility is commonplace in similar provisions and ABC will not likely
protest it. 22
Also, the provision allows Venture to convert its shares
simultaneously on the Effective Date of a Fundamental Change and
anytime thereafter during the Fundamental Change Conversion Period.
The Fundamental Change Conversion Period begins on the Effective
Date of any Fundamental Change and extends to a minimum of twenty
and a maximum of thirty calendar after such Effective Date, at the option
of ABC. 23 The calendar days will ensure the period is not effectively longer
than stated, such as if business or trading days was used instead. This
timeframe will give Venture ample opportunity to decide whether to effect
conversion upon occurrence of a Fundamental Change, with the added
incentive of the additional Fundamental Change Dividend Make-Whole
Premium (a separately drafted provision to be placed in subsection (c) of
the Fundamental Change provision). 24 Under another already drafted
section, Venture will retain its ordinary optional conversion right under,
at any other time, including prior to a Fundamental Change. 25 This
E.g., Cowen Group; Resolute Energy; Jones Energy; Harte; Onconova. All five
precedent documents provide for conversion of either all or a lesser number of the
preferred shares. See also Westlaw Practice Note, supra note 9.
23 This is a happy medium based on the norms reflected in the precedent documents.
E.g., Cowen Group; Resolute Energy; Jones Energy; Harte; Onconova.
24 The already drafted make-whole premium, essentially providing for lost dividends if
Venture converts early upon a Fundamental Change, is crucial to ensure Venture’s initial
expected dividends. See Walther, supra note 8, at 196–99 (arguing for more protections
because conversion rights “merely give the preferred the ability to participate in the
upside potential created by the common's excessive risk taking.”).
25 The already drafted non-Fundamental Change optional conversion right will provide
Venture a crucial power to convert its shares earlier, albeit at a lower rate, to attempt to
stop or mitigate an impending unfavorable transaction. See AGR Halifax Fund, Inc. v.
22
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Fundamental Change Conversion Period range, rather than a fixed time
period, will also ensure ABC has flexibility in limiting Venture’s option to
convert so as not to overly burden ABC’s actions post-transaction. I also
added limiting language from another document that does not allow this
time period to go beyond the Mandatory Conversion Date to prevent
conflicts if ABC goes through a Fundamental Change in close proximity
to the Mandatory Conversion Date.
3. Amount of Notice in Advance of a Fundamental Change
ABC must provide Venture with written notice within at least
fifteen calendar days of any anticipated Fundamental Change. Notice to
shareholders, both common and preferred, is a crucial aspect of corporate
governance. 26 In some jurisdictions, including Delaware, directors and
majority stockholders can circumvent regular notice requirements, making
it paramount that Venture receive explicit and sufficient notice. 27 This
number of days is a compromise between the longer notice period desired
by Venture and the shorter period demanded by ABC. 28 This notice will
provide Venture sufficient time to prepare for a Fundamental Change
while not requiring ABC to show its hand too early. This provision uses
calendar days rather than trading days or business days to assuage any of
ABC’s concerns that the notice period could extend much longer than
twenty days.
Additionally, I included a parenthetical requirement that the board
must use good faith in determining the anticipated Effective Date. I did
not include language that some precedent documents used, such as “if
such prior notice is not practicable, no later than x days after the
Fundamental Change.” Such an open-ended hedging of the notice
Fiscina, 743 A.2d 1188, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1999) (detailing an example of an optional
conversion used by preferred holders to remove and replace a corporation’s directors).
26 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2018) (requiring 20 days prior notice
to all stock holders of a shareholder meeting to approve a merger, consolidation or
conversion of the corporation).
27 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (West 2018) (providing a board the ability to act
without prior notice to other shareholders if the change is consented to by the majority
of shareholders in lieu of a meeting); Klotz v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 674 A.2d 878
(Del. 1995).
28 Precedent documents ranged from as few as ten to as many as thirty days’ notice. E.g.,
Cowen Group; Resolute Energy; Jones Energy; Harte; Onconova.
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requirement could act to the detriment of Venture at the behest of the
ABC’s board. 29 I also used a more detailed, substantive explanation of
what is required in the Fundamental Change Notice to better provide
Venture with adequate awareness of all circumstances. 30 However, I did
not include an additional requirement that ABC provide further notice via
a press release, as some precedent documents required, as I did not believe
it would provide drastically more notice and it appeared more burdensome
to ABC.
B. Minor Drafting Choices
I decided to use sub-headers because the terms are all drafted in
longform. The precedent documents used several different headers for the
overall Fundamental Change section, but I settled on “Special Rights upon
a Fundamental Change” as it encompasses the broad variety of rights
under this provision, including those already drafted or expected to be
added beyond this Rider. I spread out the notice requirements into
separate paragraphs as they are somewhat lengthy and difficult to read in
one paragraph. Empty brackets in Rider A are left blank to reflect the
section number for the Fundamental Change provision.
The Defined Terms listed in the Glossary following Rider A are
only those terms relevant to the Fundamental Change provision and which
were likely not defined elsewhere before in the certificate, 31 especially the
definition of what constitutes a “Fundamental Change.” I used the
broadest definition of “Fundamental Change” within the precedent
documents I found. These terms would be placed at the beginning of the
Certificate of Designation, alphabetically ordered, and numbered
accordingly after being combined with the complete list of Defined Terms.
See, e.g., Equity-Linked Inv’rs L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(board permitted to exclude preferred holders from bidding in a Revlon-like transaction);
Greenmont Capital Partners I, LP v. Mary's Gone Crackers, Inc., No. 7265–VCP, 2012
WL 4479999, at *1 (Del. Ch. 2012) (where a board and one series of preferred holders
acted to strip a second series of preferred holders of its liquidation preference via a
conversion provision).
30 The precedent documents ranged significantly in the substance of what all is required
for sufficient notice. I utilized the option that provided the most information in the most
succinct form. E.g., Cowen Group; Resolute Energy; Jones Energy; Harte; Onconova.
31 For example, terms such as Holder, Company, Common Shares, and Board of
Directors are used in other earlier provisions of the Certificate. As such, they have been
defined beforehand and are omitted from the glossary.
29
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RIDER A
CERTIFICATE OF DESIGNATION OF 9.00% SERIES A
MANDATORY CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK OF
ABC, INC.
Section [ ]
(a)

Special Rights upon a Fundamental Change.
Optional Fundamental Change Conversion Right. In the event of
a Fundamental Change, the Holders shall have the right to
convert their Series A Mandatory Convertible Preferred
Shares in connection with the Fundamental Change, in
whole or in part, into Common Shares at the Fundamental
Change Conversion Rate at any time during the
Fundamental Change Conversion Period. A conversion of
the Series A Mandatory Convertible Preferred Shares shall
be deemed for purposes of this Section [ ] to be “in
connection with” a Fundamental Change if the conversion
occurs on a date during the Fundamental Change
Conversion Period, which shall be a date no less than
twenty calendar days after and no more than thirty
calendar days from, and including, the Effective Date of
such Fundamental Change, provided that the
Fundamental Change Conversion Period will not be
extended beyond the Mandatory Conversion Date. Upon
conversion under this Section [ ](a), converting Holders
shall receive from the Company, for each Series A
Mandatory Convertible Preferred Share:
(i)

a number of Common Shares equal to the
Fundamental Change Conversion Rate as
set forth in Section [ ](d); and

(ii)

the sum of any Accumulated Dividends
and the Fundamental Change Dividend
Make-Whole Premium as described in
Section [ ](c) below, to the extent the
Company is legally permitted to make such
payments.
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Fundamental Change Notice. To the extent the Company or
the Board of Directors is aware of a Fundamental Change,
on or before the fifteenth calendar day prior to the
anticipated Effective Date of the Fundamental Change
(determined in good faith by the Board), a written notice
(the “Fundamental Change Notice”) shall be sent by or on
behalf of the Company, by first-class mail, postage
prepaid, to the Holders of record as they appear on the
share register of the Company. Such notice shall state:
(i)
the anticipated Effective Date of the
Fundamental Change;
(ii)

that Holders shall have the right to effect a
Fundamental Change Conversion in
connection with such Fundamental
Change during the Fundamental Change
Conversion Period;

(iii)
the Fundamental Change Conversion
Period;
(iv)

if the Company shall elect to pay any
amount payable pursuant to Section 9(c)
below in full in Common Shares or in a
combination of cash and Common Shares
(and if so, will specify the combination,
which may be in percentage terms); and

(v)

the instructions a Holder must follow to
effect a Fundamental Change Conversion
in connection with such Fundamental
Change.
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GLOSSARY
()

“Effective Date” shall mean the date on which any
Fundamental Change occurs and is effective.

()

A “ Fundamental Change ” shall be deemed to have
occurred at any time after the Series A Mandatory
Convertible Preferred Stock is originally issued if any of
the following occurs:
(i) the consummation of any transaction (other than any
transaction described in clause (ii) below, whether or not
the proviso therein applies) the result of which is that a
“person” or “group” within the meaning of Section 13(d)
of the Exchange Act of 1934, other than the Corporation,
ABC, Inc., one of the Corporation’s majority-owned
Subsidiaries and our or their employee benefit plans or,
provided that the Qualifying Owners taken together do
not in the aggregate own more than 51% of the
outstanding voting power of the Corporation’s common
equity, a Qualifying Owner, has become the direct or
indirect “beneficial owner,” as defined in Rule 13d-3 under
the Exchange Act, of more than 50% of the voting power
of the Corporation’s common equity;
(ii) the consummation of (A) any recapitalization,
reclassification or change of the Corporation’s common
stock (other than a change in par value, or from par value
to no par value, or from no par value to par value, or
changes resulting from a subdivision or combination), as a
result of which the Corporation’s common stock would be
converted into, or exchanged for, stock, other securities or
other property or assets; or (B) any sale, lease or other
transfer in one transaction or a series of transactions of all
or substantially all of the consolidated assets of the
Corporation and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, to any
Person other than one of the Corporation’s Subsidiaries;
provided, however, that none of the transactions
described in clauses (A) or (B) shall constitute a
“Fundamental Change” if (x) the holders of all classes of
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the Corporation’s common equity immediately prior to
such transaction continue to own at least, directly or
indirectly, more than 50% of the surviving corporation or
transferee, or the parent thereof, immediately after such
event or (y) such transaction is effected solely to change
the Corporation’s jurisdiction of formation or to form a
holding company for the Corporation and that results in a
share exchange or reclassification or similar exchange of
the outstanding Class A Common Stock solely into
common stock of the surviving entity;
(iii) the Corporation’s common stock (or other common
stock into which the Series A Preferred Stock is
convertible) ceases to be listed or quoted on any of the
New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ Global Select
Market or the NASDAQ Global Market (or any of their
respective successors);
(iv) the stockholders of the Corporation approve any plan
or proposal for the liquidation or dissolution of the
Corporation (other than in a transaction described in
clause (ii) above);
provided, however, that a transaction or transactions
described in clause (i) or (ii) above shall not constitute a
“Fundamental Change” if at least 90% of the
consideration received or to be received by holders of
Class A Common Stock (excluding cash payments made
pursuant to dissenters’ appraisal rights) in connection with
such transaction or transactions that would otherwise
constitute a “Fundamental Change” consists of shares of
common stock or common equity interests that are listed
or quoted on any of the New York Stock Exchange, the
NASDAQ Global Select Market or the NASDAQ Global
Market (or any of their respective successors), or that will
be so listed or quoted when issued or exchanged in
connection with such transaction or transactions and as a
result of such transaction or transactions the Series A
Preferred Stock becomes convertible into such
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consideration (excluding cash payments for fractional
shares and cash payments made pursuant to dissenters’
appraisal rights).
()

“Fundamental Change Conversion Period” shall mean, in
respect of a Fundamental Change, the period beginning
on, and including, the Effective Date for the Fundamental
Change and ending on 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on
the date that is no earlier than 20 calendar days after such
Effective Date and no later than 30 calendar days from
such Effective Date (or, if earlier, the Mandatory
Conversion Date).

()

“Fundamental Change Conversion Rate” shall mean, in
respect of a Fundamental Change, the conversion rate set
forth in the conversion table in Section [ ](d).

()

“Fundamental Change Dividend Make-Whole Premium”
shall having the meaning specified in Section [ ](c).

()

“Mandatory Conversion Date” shall mean the date five
calendar years from the issuance of the Series A
Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock.

()

“Optional Fundamental Change Conversion Right” shall
mean the right of the Holders to convert their preferred
shares pursuant to Section [ ](a).

